We describe the broad range of uncertainties faced by the developers of medical technologies. Empirically, we estimate the asset market incidence of two realizations of uncertainties we classify as within-market policy risks. The events we analyze concern the intellectual property of Myriad Genetics, Inc., an American molecular diagnostics firm. In July 2013, the Supreme Court invalidated several of Myriad's intellectual property claims. Subsequently, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services reevaluated the reimbursements it pays for the services at issue in this patent litigation. We estimate that these events substantially moved Myriad's market capitalization, by just under 25 percent in the case of the Supreme Court's decision and nearly 20 percent in the case of CMS's reimbursement rate redetermination. Myriad's exposure to the realization of these intellectual property risks reflects its unusually high reliance on revenues linked to the services at issue. We discuss the implications of these risks for the total volume of medical innovation and for its organization across firms. * 
I Introduction
Risk and expected returns shape the aggregate volume and organization of innovative activity. While the theory underlying these linkages has received ample attention, cataloging and quantifying the risks relevant in any particular industry requires empirical documentation and attention to institutional detail. In this paper, we demonstrate the relevance of understudied forms of "within-market policy risks" for the returns to the development of medical technology.
In Section 2 we organize the risks faced by medical innovators into a coherent typology. First among our typology's broad categories are pre-market risks. This category, which has been widely studied, includes standard risks associated with product development and regulatory approval. Our second broad category encompasses within-market economic risks. These risks, also widely studied, include the introduction of competing products and, more broadly, threats to a product's demand. A third category involves what we call within-market policy risks. This category includes risks such as patent invalidation and post-approval threats to a product's reimbursement status within public and private insurers' payment systems.
In Section 3 we empirically assess the asset market incidence of two distinctive realizations of within-market policy risk. Specifically, we analyze the market capitalization of Myriad Genetics, a company known primarily for its development of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 molecular diagnostic tests for breast and ovarian cancer. As detailed in Section 3, Myriad's case is remarkable along multiple dimensions. Myriad's intellectual property was addressed by the Supreme Court, which ultimately invalidated some of its patent claims. Following the Supreme Court's decision, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) re-evaluated its reimbursements for the affected services. Further, Myriad's finances are unusually reliant on the revenues generated by the affected product lines.
The validity of the disputed patent claims and the generosity of Medicare's reimbursements thus had significant implications for Myriad's future profitability. Section 3's analysis reveals that the resolution of these policy risks significantly affected Myriad's market capitalization. We estimate that the Supreme Court's invalidation of Myriad's intellectual property reduced its valuation by roughly 23 percent, or in excess of $500 million. Subsequent re-determination of Medicare's reimbursements for Myriads tests similarly moved Myriad's market capitalization by several hundred million dollars.
Further, Myriad's capitalization exhibited high volatility throughout the time period in question. We conclude with a discussion of these policy risks' implications for aggregate levels of medical innovation, for the direction of innovative effort, and for the structure of the firms in which this innovation takes place.
II Characterization of the Risks Faced by Medical Innovators
Innovators face a litany of uncertainties. This section presents a typology of the risks to which those who invest in innovation, and in particular in medical innovation, are exposed.
We begin by defining three broad categories of uncertainty. We then discuss the extent to which these uncertainties have been analyzed in prior work and, to the extent that they have, how they have been found to affect innovative activity.
II.a A Broad Typology of Uncertainties
In this section we succinctly define three broad categories of risk faced by medical innovators and their investors.
Pre-Market Risks: Pre-market risks encompass all risks realized prior to a product's introduction to the market. Such risks occur over the course of the development and regulatory approval processes.
Within-Market Economic Risks: Within-market economic risks encompass all standard economic threats to the demand for an innovator's product. Such risks include the in-2 troduction of superior or lower-cost substitutes. Demand may also be affected by changes in the prevalence of the medical condition at which a given innovation is targeted.
Within-Market Policy Risks: Within-market policy risks encompass post-approval, policy-driven threats to an innovation's profitability. By nature, such risks depend on the specifics of the markets under consideration. Examples include reassessments of the validity of intellectual property claims and reassessments of a technology's efficacy and side effects. They also include changes in the generosity of public insurers' reimbursements, both in aggregate and for specific products.
II.b Implications for the Volume and Organization of Medical Innovation
Uncertainties have implications for both the volume and organization of innovative activity. In general, due to the costs of financial distress and the asymmetric outcomes associated with downward and upward variability, they reduce expected returns and will tend to reduce innovative effort. Uncertainty has further been found to stall both investment and overall economic activity conditional upon expected returns (Bloom, 2009; Shoag and Veuger, 2014) . To the extent that the associated risks can be diversified across product lines, they will tend to increase the scale of the organizations within which innovative activity takes place. In the remainder of this section we illustrate the uncertainties at work in the context of medical innovation and discuss the state of the evidence on their relevance.
II.b.1 Pre-Market Risks
Pre-market risks include the uncertainties of the product development and regulatory approval processes. The scientific difficulty of discovery and the stringency of regulatory approval shape medical innovation's expected returns. Because some aspects of the uncertainty they introduce can be smoothed through scale, these uncertainties have direct implications for innovation's organization.
Research on pre-market risks has focused primarily on the pharmaceutical sector.
Broad descriptions of pharmaceutical development find that roughly 1 in 5,000 to 10,000 molecules investigated by basic researchers ultimately make their way to market (Lipsky and Sharp, 2001) . With expected total costs between pre-clinical and clinical development approaching $1 billion (DiMasi et al., 2003) , it should not be surprising that pharmaceutical development has historically been concentrated among firms of substantial scale.
That said, biotechnology's rise has been associated with a proliferation of smaller players (Cockburn, 2004) .
Recent evidence from cancer trials shows that the expected length of the approval process shapes the direction and volume of innovative activity (Budish et al., 2013) . Because firms patent potential cancer treatments early in the approval process, for example, the process's length reduces a firm's period of patent exclusivity. And because it is easier to demonstrate the efficacy of drugs targeted at cancers that kill quickly, Budish et al. (2013) find that firms invest relatively little in the development of treatments for cancers with low rates of short-term mortality.
II.b.2 Within-Market Economic Risks
Within-market economic risks include a variety of standard, post-approval uncertainties involving a product's profitability. Such uncertainties can involve either the size of the pool of a product's potential purchasers or changes in the state of competition. As detailed in the following paragraph, the demand-side drivers of potential market size have received significant attention in the relevant literature. The introduction of competing products has received detailed attention in the growth literature, in particular in the context of "creative destruction" models of growth and innovation (Aghion and Howitt, 1992) .
Within-market risks are perhaps the most widely studied in the empirical literature, which typically finds medical innovation to be highly responsive to the relevant incentives.
For example, research has found both drug and medical equipment innovation to exhibit significant responsiveness to the market contractions and expansions implied by shifting demographics, coverage regimes, and public health requirements. Acemoglu and Linn (2004) , for example, find that investments in pharmaceutical developments closely tracked the evolution of market size as implied by the baby boom's population bulge. Clemens 
II.b.3 Within-Market Policy Risks
Within-market policy risks involve legal uncertainties that influence a product's market standing. The political economy and public choice literatures focus most of their attention in this context on regulatory capture and lobbying, that is, attempts to write the rules of the game, as opposed to navigating them as they are (Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998; Djankov et al., 2002) . The corporate strategy literature lends more attention to this, but typically adopts the perspective of a single firm, without considering the impact of the regulatory environment on industrial organization and aggregate outcomes (e.g. Wilson and Veuger (2015) ).
We emphasize the risks associated with intellectual property claims and public insurers' reimbursement policies. Initial patent and product approval are not guaranteed to be permanent. The risks of patent invalidation and revocation of product approval thus have straightforward implications for innovations' expected returns. Similarly, public insurers are not obligated to maintain any initially negotiated reimbursement rates.
These institutional risks have received limited attention in the literature on medical innovation. Below we estimate the asset market incidence of two recent realizations of such risks. The first involves the Supreme Court's invalidation of a subset of the patent claims held by Myriad Genetics, Inc. Following the invalidation of Myriad's patent claims, the federal Medicare program re-evaluated the reimbursement rates it pays for the relevant medical products. 1 Our second piece of analysis thus involves the asset market incidence of a major announcement in the reimbursement redetermination process.
Our analysis of these instances of product-specific reimbursement risk can be contrasted with the implications of recent work on aggregate medical reimbursement risk (Koijen et al., 2014) . Diversification across product lines can provide relief from idiosyncratic reimbursement risk, but not against aggregate reimbursement risk. Because aggregate reimbursement risk cannot be diversified away, it has implications for the industrywide risk premium and the volume of innovative activity. By contrast, product-specific reimbursement risks create a rationale for pooling the revenue streams associated with a diverse array of medical products. The same can be said for the risk of product-specific patent invalidation.
In the remainder of this paper, our purpose is to demonstrate the dramatic implications that institutional risks can have for medical innovators. Our particular empirical setting highlights the high importance of such risks to small-scale innovators, with implications for the sector's industrial organization.
III The Importance of Within-Market Policy Risks: Evidence from the Case of Myriad Genetics
This section presents evidence that institutional risks can indeed exert significant influence over the fortunes of medical innovators and their investors. The evidence takes the form of events involving legal and reimbursement rate determinations affecting Myriad 1 Reimbursement changes may alter the returns to innovation through effects on both prices and on the quantity demanded. In some cases, the quantity demanded is mediated by health providers' technology adoption decisions. An expanding body of research, including studies by Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008) , Clemens and Gottlieb (2014), and Freedman et al. (2012) , finds that technology adoption responds to reimbursement policy in the standard direction.
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Genetics, Inc (hereafter simply "Myriad"). Myriad provides molecular diagnostic screening and holds patents covering a variety of claims related to the services it provides. As detailed below, Myriad's revenue stream was highly exposed to the performance of a single product line. The legal and reimbursement determinations we analyze thus involved sufficient risk that, as shown, the resolution of the associated uncertainties significantly moved Myriad's market capitalization.
III.a Background on Myriad Genetics
Myriad, founded in 1991, is an American molecular diagnostic firm headquartered in Salt Lake City, Utah, and traded publicly on the NASDAQ Global Select Market (Myriad Genetics, Inc., 2014b). The firm's market capitalization has averaged $2.1 billion over the past five years, while its net income averaged some $130 million (YCharts, 2014) . per test (GenomeWeb, 2014; Reeves, 2014) . This second payment change, which appears in Myriad's stock movements to have contained significant new information, is the second event we analyze.
III.b Overview of Our Empirical Analysis
In the remainder of this section we analyze the "abnormal" returns of Myriad genetics stock. Our goal in constructing these abnormal returns is to estimate the effects of decisions by the Supreme Court and CMS on Myriad's market capitalization. That is, our goal is to estimate the asset market incidence of these instances of intellectual-property invalidation and reimbursement rate redetermination, and we define abnormal returns as Myriad's returns relative to the expected return in the absence of the events we study. More specifically, Myriad's abnormal return from day t to day t + 1 is:
At least two difficulties must be overcome for our estimates to be informative regarding our questions of asset market incidence. The first difficulty involves the standard empirical problem of establishing a relevant counterfactual: the expected return. We will address this in two different ways The CCMP is the NASDAQ Composite Index, which includes all stocks listed on NAS-DAQ that are not exchange-traded funds, derivatives, preferred shares, etcetera. It includes over 3,000 firms. As noted above, the ideal benchmark for our analysis would be an index including firms subject to similar aggregate subjects and exhibiting similar degrees of volatility under "normal" market conditions. Because the NBI includes other firms in the biotechnology sector, it is relatively well-suited from the perspective of capturing firms that would experience aggregate shocks similar to those experienced by Myriad. We use the S&P 400 because, as an index of mid-cap firms of which Myriad is one, it may capture the degree of volatility one might expect for a firm of Myriad's size. The S&P 500
and CCMP have less to recommend them as benchmarks for Myriad per se, but provide a broader sense of the performance of equities over the analysis period. As revealed below, our characterization of Myriad's performance depends little on the index to which we compare it.
Second, we use an event study methology to calculate cumulative abnormal returns.
We apply the standard "market model" (MacKinlay, 1997) using the same indices discussed earlier. Here, normal returns, R it , are calculated by estimating R it = α i + β i R mt + ε it , under the assumption that E[ε it ] = 0 and Var[ε it ] = σ 2 εi , where R mt is the return of a given market index. The abnormal return, AR it , is then computed as the difference between the actual return, A it , and the normal return predicted by the model:
The sum of these abnormal returns over select trading days is then the cumulative abnormal return.
The second difficulty we face involves the role of expectations. Abnormal returns capture changes in the expected net present value of a firm's stream of future profits relative to the market. Expectations regarding the events we analyze will, of course, be reflected in Myriad's valuation prior to the event's realization. It was known, for example, that the Supreme Court would issue a decision. It was unknown whether that decision would go "for" or "against" Myriad and to what degree. For simplicity, suppose the decision was binary and that it was, at time t, expected to go against Myriad with probability p.
Letting π t denote Myriad's profit in period t and δ the relevant discount factor, we write the decision's impact on Myriad's profitability as:
The change in market capitalization thus captures
which is the decision's total incidence scaled by 1-p.
The total incidence of the events we study could thus be recovered given knowledge of the relevant probabilities. As we do not have such knowledge, we are only able to estimate suggestive bounds. Importantly, the estimates will in no case overstate an event's total impact on Myriad's expected profit stream. Commentary surrounding the timing of the Supreme Court decision suggests a significant division of views regarding the extent to which the court's ruling would invalidate Myriad's intellectual property. By contrast, CMS's April 1st increase in the reimbursement rates applicable to BRACAnalysis was largely unexpected. The abnormal returns to the latter event thus likely come close to approximating the CMS decision's total incidence. The abnormal returns to the for- Table 1 further elaborate on the impact of these events. The histograms reveal Myriad's decline to be well below experience of other firms in the comparison indices. The bulk of price changes over this interval ranged from -5 to 5%.
III.d Event 1: The Effect of Patent Invalidation on Myriad's Stock Price
3 Note that in this and the subsequent figures we technically do not yet present "abnormal" returns in the sense described by equation 1; those are shown in Table 1 . In Figure 1 we simply present cumulative relative returns of the form:
12 Table 1 's Panel A presents an analysis of Myriad's abnormal returns over a set of shorter windows surrounding the Supreme Court's decision. These include the day of the event (from closing the day before to closing the day of), the four day period starting at close before the event, and the four day period that commences at close three days before the event. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using the standard "market model"
and are again presented relative to each of the four comparison indices described above.
Below each estimate of the relevant abnormal return, we present t-statistics implied by 
III.f Implications of the Magnitudes of Myriad's Changes in Market Capitalization
We begin this section by more fully assessing the magnitudes of the observed changes in Myriad's market capitalization. Both the Supreme Court decision and the reimbursement re-determination altered Myriad's market capitalization by around $500 million. 5
The precise nature of the information transmitted by these decisions is, of course, difficult to determine. It is unclear, for example, with what probability investors expected the Supreme Court's decision to go against Myriad, and to go against it to the degree that it did. $500 million is a clear lower bound on the full economic value of the decision's impact.
We now turn to Medicare's reimbursement rate redetermination. In the fiscal year ending June 30th, 2014, Myriad generated $520 million in revenue from its BRACAnalysis product line. Were these services reimbursed at $1,438 rather than $2,184, the resulting revenue would have been $340 million. The differential, assuming application of Medicare's rate for all services, thus amounts to $180 million per year. The increase in Myriad's market capitalization is nearly three times this amount.
Medicare accounts for a modest share of Myriad's BRACAnalysis revenues. Over the period of Medicare's reimbursement re-determination, analysts put Medicare's share at 10 percent (Britt, 2013 (Britt, 2013) . While the rationale underlying private insurers' reliance on Medicare's payment rates is not necessarily what "one would expect," it has been documented to be a widespread phenomenon (Clemens and Gottlieb, 2013) . In the present case, private payment spillovers of this form appear to have significantly amplified the effects of Medicare's payment change.
IV Discussion and Conclusion
Past theoretical research has shown how uncertainty about the broader environment in which firms operate can affect their behavior (Rodrik, 1991; Hassett and Metcalf, 1999 ).
Here we have documented the relevance of policy risks for this kind of decision-making.
There are strong theoretical grounds to believe that these micro-level adjustments can have important aggregate implications (Friedman, 1968; Bernanke, 1983) , and recent empirical evidence appears to bear these theories out (Bloom, 2009; Shoag and Veuger, 2014) .
As an example, Myriad's degree of exposure to intellectual property and reimbursement rate risk has clear implications for the organization of medical innovation. In both
instances, the risks we analyze could effectively be smoothed away by increasing the scope of Myriad's activities for the purpose of diversifying across product lines. Indeed, "Diversifying Our Portfolio" made column 1 of the "Dear Shareholders" letter in Myriad's 2014
Annual Report (Myriad Genetics, Inc., 2014a) . Such diversification would benefit many of Myriad's stakeholders, including its owners, who would be less burdened by the nondiversifiable cost of (potential) financial dire straits. Further, because the relevant institutional uncertainties are primarily downside risks, they depress expected returns and can be expected, by extension, to reduce aggregate levels of technology development. Whether one believes that levels of medical innovation are sub-optimally low (Murphy and Topel, 2003) , or worries about its cost and direction (Weisbrod, 1991) , the stakes associated with health-sector innovation policy and the institutional uncertainty it can produce are high. Note: Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using the standard "market model": normal returns, R it , are calculated by estimating R it = α i + β i R mt + ε it , under the assumption that E[ε it ] = 0 and Var[ε it ] = σ 2 εi , where R mt is the return of a given market index. The abnormal return, AR it , is then computed as the difference between the actual return, A it , and the normal return predicted by the model: AR it = A it − (α i + β i R mt ). The sum of these abnormal returns over select trading days is then the cumulative abnormal return. Abnormal returns are given relative to four benchmark indices (the S&P 500 Index, the NBI Index, the CCMP Index, and the S&P 400 Index). The estimation window runs from 150 trading days before to 30 days after the event. Data are from Bloomberg.
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A Appendix
This appendix provides further information regarding important legal and business events in the recent history of Myriad Genetics, Inc. The event listings serve two purposes. First, they further flesh out the context within which our asset market analyses take place. Second, in some instances they characterize Myriad's responses to the business and legal environment it faced.
I.a Supreme Court Time Line
The list below summarizes major events in the case Association for Molecular Pathol- 
